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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SOREN J. JESPERSEN, ROY H.
EAST, HOWARD J. HASSELL
and ROY W. BROWN, doing business as POWER ENGINEERING
COMPANY, a partnership,
Plaintiffs and Resp10ndents,

Case No.

-vs.-

85281

DESERET NEWS PUBLISHING
CO~IP ANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appellant's Brief
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This suit was brought by the Plaintiffs against the
Defendant to recover under the terms of a written lease
for damages to a building and payment of rent. The
complaint is in the usual form but in two counts.
In the first count the Plaintiffs seek damages to the
floor in the building which collapsed during its occupancy
by the Defendant. In the second count the Plaintiffs
1
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seek recovery of the rent for the unexpired term of
the lease after the Defendant abandoned the building
following the collapse of the floor.
The Court, sitting without a jury awarded judgment for damages to the building in the first cause of
action in the sum of $3,000.00 and for rent for the
unexpired term of the lease in the sum of $2,025.00 and
for $500.00 attorney fees and costs.
ADMITTED FACTS
Defendant leased from Plaintiffs the West 145
feet of a building known as Building No. 181, located
at 1710 South Redwood Road. The lease provides for a
term of 12 months, the rental for that period to be
$2,700.00 payable at the rate of $225.00 per month. The
term commenced on the 23rd day of August, 1948. It
is to be noted that there is no leasing of land, but there
is only a lease of a ,portion of the building. This fact
is important. In addition to the usual ·provisions in the
lease it provided, "that the said lessee further agrees
to deliver up said premises to said lessors at the expiration of said term in as good order and condition
as when the same was entered upon by said lessee,
reasonable use and wear thereof and damage by the
elements excepted. ''
Negotiations for the lease were commenced on Friday, August 20, 1948, at which time an agent of the
Defendant telephoned the Plaintiff East and inquired
about renting warehouse space. (Tr. 107-108). During.
2
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the negotiations on this day, and subsequently, a full
disclosure was made by the Defenda~t of the purpose
for which the warehouse was to be rented. (Tr. 109).
The Plaintiff, East, conducted these negotiations for
the Plaintiff partnership. This storage space was needed
innnediately because of the fact that 15 railroad cars
were being held up until the newsprint which they contained could be unloaded. Over the weekend, between
the 20th of August and the 23rd of August, it was
necessary for the Plaintiffs to remove a number of
partitions which were in that portion of the building
the Defendant was going to lease. (Tr. 110). The
Plaintiffs were fully informed of the weight and size
of the rolls of newsprint which were to be stored. (Tr.
112). The Plaintiffs were informed of the manner in
which these rolls were to be stacked. These rolls of
newsprint had a dian1eter of 38 inches and were of four
sizes. The 66 inch rolls weighed approximately 1600
pounds each, the 49lj2 inch rolls weighed approximately
1200 pounds each, the 33 inch, approximately 800 pounds
each, and the 30 inch, approximately 650 ·pounds each.
(Tr. 114).
The Plaintiff East was in and about the prem1ses
during the time that the railroad cars were being unloaded and the newsprint stored in the building. This
operation commenced August 23rd and took approximately three or four days. (Tr. 120).
The flooring sustained the load of this newsprint
t:.ntil Sunday, forenoon the 19th day of September, 1948
"!1ich was the date on which the flooring in the South3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

west portion of the building collapsed. (Tr. 145). The
weather report which was introduced without objection
showed 43j100 of an inch of rain had fallen the Saturday afternoon and Sunday morning. (Exhibit 6).
Defendant's agents were concerned about the sufficiency of the floor to hold the weight of these rolls of
newsprint. Mr. East stated that the floor was of sufficient strength to hold this newsprint. The Defendant•s
agents stated that he assured them on a number of
occasions that the floor was of sufficient strength to
withstand the load of these rolls. (Tr. 205) As a matter of
fact, the Plaintiff East conceded that in the portion of the
building retained by Plaintiffs, they had stacked some
sort of bricks, and had loaded the floor to the extent
of Five or Six hundred ·pounds per square foot, (Tr.
206), a weight very much in excess of the load placed
upon the floor in Defendant's portion of the building.
It is uncontradicted that in this case that the
building was erected during war years for a temporary
purpose and that a poor grade of material was used in
its construction.
STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH APPELLANT INTENDS TO RELY FOR THE REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT MADE AND GIYEX
HEREIN.
I.

That the evidence is insufficient to support finding
No. 3 to the effect that Defendant stored certa~n materials therein in such amounts and in such a manner
4
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that Defendant broke said floor and sub-flooring or
caused said floor to be broken and smashed, said pilings
to be driven downward and out of line and the walls
of said building to be broken and pushed out of line.

II.
That the e\Tidence is insufficient to support findings
Xo. 4 and 5 to the effect that said damages were in
excess of the reasonable use and wear of said premises
or damages by the elements and that reasonable cost
of restoring said building to its former good order and
condition is the sum of $3,000.00.

III.
That the evidence is insufficient to support finding
~o. 7 to the effect that Plaintiff is entitled to recover
the sum of $2,025.00 as rental for the reason that the
destruction of said building terminated the relationship
of landlord and tenant between Plaintiff and Defendant.

ARGUMENT
The Three points on which Defendant relies are
so interrelated that they may be properly discussed
under two heads. The lease provides that the building
must be delivered up to said lessors at the expiration
~ f the term in as good order and condition as t1w same
was entered upon by said lessee, ''reasonable use ann
,year thereof and damage by the elements excepted.''
It is the contention of the Defendant that the
tlamages to the building was the result of either or both
5
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and that the Defendant was relieved of any liability
for the damages to the building and further that the
building was rendered untenantable by reason thereof
without the fault of the Defendant and thereby was
relieved of paying any further rent.
One of the main issues of fact in this case was 'the
cause of the collapse of the flooring of the building. It.
is the contention of the defendant that under the above
quoted covenant of the lease, it makes no difference
whether the collapse of the floor was caused by overloading it or whether the floor collapsed because of
the action of the elements. If the collapse was due to
overload, it nevertheless was within the contemplation
of the parties, caused by reasonable use and wear. H
such is the case, there is no liability under the said
covenant contained in the lease. On the other hand,
if the collapse was due to the action of the elements,
then and in such evidence, the defendant would be relieved from liability by reason of said covenant.

REASONABLE USE
This is a contract action, and as will be shown by
the authorities hereinafter cited, the meaning of the
phrase "reasonable use and wear," must be given the
meaning contemplated or intended by the parties. It
can readily be seen that the phrase "reasonable use
and wear" would have an entirely different meaning if
the portion of the warehouse rented was to be used fot
an office than it would if such portion was to be u~ed
for the storing of heavy merchandise, such as newsprin~.

6
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"~ e

subn1it that the building wa~ used for the very
purpose contemplated by both parties to this agreement.
On cross examination, the plaintiff East admitted that
he knew of the manner in which this newsprint was to
be stored and he knew the weight and size of the rolls
and the manner in which it \Vas to be stacked. (Tr. 215 }.
He not only was informed of these matters before the
storing of the news·print commenced, but he was in and
about the building at all times that the defendant'3
agents were unloading and storing this newsprint and
saw the manner in which it was being stored. (Tr. 205).
On cross examination, he stated that he thought that
the floor was sufficient to hold the newsprint, and that
he made no objection at any time during the process of
storing the newsprint. l-Ie conceded in so many words
that he believed the use to which the building was being
put was a reasonable and proper use. He conceded
that in that portion of the building retained by plaintiffs, (Tr. 207), they had loaded the floor to an even
greater weight per square foot. Of course, the defendant, through its agent, also believed that this use was
a reasonable and proper use.
We therefore submit that it is established in this
case that the collapse of the flooring was due to "reasonable use and wear", as contemplated by the parties in
making this use of the building. We believe that this
issue is one of fact and also one of law. The authorities
will be hereinafter cited.
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DA~1:AGE

BY THE ELEMENTS

Plaintiff in this action is suing the defendant for
a breach of the above quoted ·provision of the lease
contending that· the premises were not delivered up in
as good order and condition as when the same were
entered upon by the defendant, ''reasonable use and
wear thereof and damage by the elements excepted."
Plaintiffs have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that this covenant was breached.
Plaintiffs' experts testified that the sole cause of
the collapse was the overload. (Tr. 80). As above
pointed out, even if this were so, defendant still did
not breach this covenant. However, we believe that
the plaintiff has failed in its burden of proof and that
as a matter of fact and under all of the circumstances,
the most reasonable conclusion is that the cause of the
collapse was due to "damage by the elements."
The newsprint was loaded upon the flooring of the
building commencing August 23. The flooring sustained
theload of this newHprint until the 19th day of September, 1948, which was the date on which the flooring jn
the Southwest portion of the building collapsed. The
exhibit from the weather department shows that during
Saturday afternoon and night and Sunday morning,
• there was a very heavy rai~ fall. This rain fall \YP.:-'
unusual for this part of the country. r:ehe testimolly
further disclosed that the ground was at such a Ieve I
that the water would accumulate in this Southwest
section of the building and in and around the two rows
of pilings identified as rows "B" and "C" in the testi8
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mony. ~lr. 'Vyeoff, who handled the storing of the
newsprint for the defendant, examined the flooring on
~[onday. Septe1nber 20. (Tr. 128). In making the examination he got down into the collapsed section of the
flooring, examined the ground at that point and looked
in under the flooring which had not collapsed. He testified that there was an accumulation of water in this
Southwest section of the building and that in looking
in under the other portions of the building, the ground
appeared to be dry. He was able to push a stick into the
ground near one of the footings a distance of 2 feet.
(Tr. 147). This disclosed the nature of the soil and the
fact that it was of such a nature that it would readily
permit the footings to sink. Mr. Ulrich, an ex,pert witness called by the defendant, testified that in his opinion,
the cause of the collapse was due to the sinking of one
or more of these footings, causing a heavier load to be
placed on the joists supported thereby. and causing the
floor to collapse. (Tr. 146-168). It is true that the plaintiff Jespersen stated that there was no water under
this portion of the building, but he based his conclusion
upon the fact that he saw no damage to the newsprint
and from an observation he took from the outside of
the building, we submit that Mr. Wycoff was in by far
the better position to observe the conditions of this part
of the building.
Then too, there is the fact that the other flooring
in the building did not collapse, although loaded to the
same extent as the flooring in the Southwest ·portion
of the building. If there had been no weight upon the
floor of any kind, ~f course there would have been no
9
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collapse of the floor. There had to be weight upon this
floor for there to have been a collapse. But· without
the water condition and the resultant weakening of the
soil and sinking of the footing or footings there would
have been no collapse. The floor was subjected to the
strain of a 20 foot span instead of the 10 foot span
under which it had been constructed.
THE FLOOR WAS NOT OVERLOADED
As to whether or not there was an overload placed
upon this floor, the evidence is in direct conflict as
above indicated. Even if it were overloaded, no liability
could be visited upon the defendant and therefore this
issue is really immaterial in this case.
Naturally, we believe that t,he testimony of .l\lr.
Ulrich should be followed, and it appears to be the most
reasonable. The floor had withstood this "\Veight for
approximately 26 days and only after the severe rain
and the collection of water under this portion of the
building did ·the floor fall. The rest of the flooring remained, other than this collapsed section which continued to sustain the same weight which had been
placed upon it.
We believe that Mr. Ulrich, due to his experience
and training was better qualified than any other expert
at· the trial. The experts testified to certain formulas
and arrived at different results in connection with the
strength of this floor. It is difficult upon just the
looking at the formula and considering the answers of

10
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each expert to arrive at a conclusion as to which should
be followed. But we believe that the surrounding circum~tanre~ just above ~et forth tend to bear out the
testimony and condusions reached by 1Ir. Ulrirh. Here
again, the burden of proof is upon plaintiffs to show
by the preponderance of the evidence the cause of the
collapse of the floor.
DEFENDANT IS NOT LIABLE FOR RENT
There is a general rule of the common law that
the liability of the tenant for rent is not affected by
the fact that buildings or improvements on the land
leased are wholly or partially destroyed by some unforeseen casualty. In s,pite of this general rule, howeYer, upon two grounds, we believe that this rule is not
applicable to the case at bar. The first reason is that
this old common law rule is outmoded, is harsh and
~e",'ere, and is not one which is applicable to present
<lay conditions. The second reason is that there is a
well established exception to this common law rule
recognized in the United States where the lease is not
of the land, but is of a portion of a building .
•THE

CO~LMON

LAW RULE SHOULD NOT BE
ADOPTED

Section 88-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, pro,·ides in part so far as material here as follows:
"The common law of England * * * so far
only as it is consistent with and ,adapted to the
natural and physical conditions of this state and
11
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the necessities of the people thereof, is hereby
adopted and shall be the rule of decision in all
courts of this state."
The common law rule contended for by the plaintiffs which visits upon a tenant's liability for rent where
the subject matter of the lease is substantially destroyed does not. come or certainly is not constant with
or adapted to present day conditions in this State, and
the necessities of the ·people. It has been severely
criticized by many courts.
In Whitaker v .. Hawley, 25 Kan. 674, 26 Pacific
States Reports 471, 37 Am. Rep. 277, Judge Brewer,
who subsequently became a Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States, severely criticized this
ruling. (This criticism is not found in the case as reported in the American Reporters Citation, but is contained in the Pacific States Reports, which may be found
in our County Law Library). In this case, Justice
Brewer points out that this rule is a hold over from
feudal times, and is not in accord with modern day conditions. In this case he quotes from Gates v. Green, 4
Page 354, as follows :
"It appears to be a principle of natural law
that a tenant who rents a house or other tenement for a short period, and with a view to rio
other benefit except that which may be derived
from its actual use, should not be compelled to
·pay rent any longer than the tenement is capable
of being used.''
In Scott Brothers v. Flood's Trustee, Ky. 99 S.\Y.
967, the court referred to the common law rule which

12
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had been changed by statute in l{entucky as being a
'·harsh and unreasonable rule of the common law,'' and
that such rule "'in1posed upon him (tenant) an unreasonable burden.''
The common law rule was further criticized by the
court in Taylor v. Hart, 73 Miss. 22, 18 So. 546, 30 L.R.A.
716, wherein the court referred to the opinion in Whitaker v. Hawley, supra, in the following language:

"* * * in an opinion of great learning and
power, exposing the absurdities of the common
law rule on this general subject as especially
applied to the condition of society existing with
us.''
Perhaps the leading case which refused to follow
the common la\v rule is the case of Wattles v. So. Omaha
Ice and Coal Company, 15 Neb. 251, 69 N.vV. 785, 36
L.R.A. 424, 61 Am. St. Rep. 554. In that case, the
plaintiff leased to the defendant certain land and buildings wherein the defendant stored ice. After the defendant had entered ·possession, the buildings were destroyed and rendered entirely valueless. Plaintiff in
this action sought to recover the rent reserve in the
lease accrued subsequently to the destruction of the
buildings. The court repudiated the common law rule
and held that the defendant was not liable for the rent.
'Ve will take the liberty of quoting at length from this
case because it is the best expression we have been able
to find refusing to follow the common law rule. The
conclusion of court is stated as follows:
"We reach the conclusion that the common
law rule of construction under consideration is
13
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not in force in this state, and formulate the rule
as follows: Where a substantial portion of leased
premises is destroyed without the fault of the
lessee, he is entitled to an apportionment of the
rent covenanted to he paid and accruing thereafter, in the absence of an express assumption by
him of the risk of such destruction.''
In reaching this conclusion, the court stated:
''By the lease under consideration, the
premises were let to the lessee for a specified
term, in consideration of which he covenanted to
pay to the lessor a specific sum as rent, payable~
in installments, on certain dates during the term.
The lease contained no provision binding the
lessor to rebuild. The lease contained no provision for any abatement of the rent promised for
any reason whatsoever. The question presented
is: A substantial part of the leased premises
having been destroyed ·without the fault of
either lessor or lessee, is the latter entitled to an
apportionment of the rent accruing thereafter?
The common-law construction of such a covenant
as this would not relieve the tenant from payment of the entire rent reserved."
In further discussing this rule, the court stated:
"This rule has often been assailed as utterly
repugnant to justice and reason * * * and so
harsh was the operation of the rule that in many
states * * * statutes have been passed for the
purpose of modifying or abrogating it."
''The clear tendency of all the n1odern decisions, in our states, has been to modify the rule
of the common law as to work out a result just
and equitable in the situation."

14
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Quoting from another case, the court stated:
'• The clear tendency of the rulings has been
to do away with the common law technicalities
concerning real estate, and to bring the rules of
the common law more in harmony with those respecting ·personal property and that the distinctions growing out of the feudal system are disappearing, and this distinction between the lease
of real property and the hiring of chattels is one
which sooner or later will cease to exist.''
The court then discusses the old English case, Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26, which was the case considered
to be the first one to expound the common law rule.
Then the court discusses the establishment of the exception to the rule where the lease is of only a portion
of a building, which exception was first announced in
1832 in the case of Winton v. Cornish, 5 Ohio 477. In
discussing this exception, the court stated:
''Indeed, the exception to the rule seems to
be about as well established in the United States
as the rule itself. In some of the cases following
the rule, the reasons for its existence are said
to be that it is only equitable that the lesse~
should pay the entire rent, notwithstanding a destruction of the part of the leased premises, since
the lessor must bear the loss of the destroyed
property, and that the enforcement of the rule
tends to diminish the carelessness and increase
the vigilance of a lessee. We do not know what
reason led to the formulation of this rule, but, if
the one quoted above is the correct one, it is of
no force at the present time, because the lessor
may protect his interest in the property while in
the hands of the lessee by insurance. The reason
given for the formulation of the exception to

15
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the rule is that by a lease of a room or basement
in a building, no interest in the soil passes to the
lessee, and that, when the basement or room is
destroyed, the leased estate is gone, and the
relation of landlord and tenant terminated. But
it seems to us that another principle underlies
and controls the exception, and that is this: that,
the leased room or building having been destroyed
without the fault of the lessee, the consideration
for his promise to pay the rent accruing thereafter failed. The common-law rule announced in
Paradine v. Jane is merely a rule of construction
of a real-estate contract.
We have already seen to· what extent the
common law is in force in this state, and have
noted the command of the legislature to the courts
of this state, in construing real-estate contracts,
to look to the subject-matter of the contract, the
language employed by the contracting partie3,
and to ascertain, if possible, and give effect to,
the intention of the contracting parties. A lease
for real estate is not a bargain and sale for a
given time of the lessor's interest in the leased
premises. It is rather a hiring or letting of property for a certain time, and for a named consideration; and, when a lessee covenants to pay rent
for a term, the consideration for that covenant
is his right to the use and occupancy of the thing
leased. In the covenant of a lessee to pay at
stated times certain sums of money for the rent
-that is, for the privilege or the right to use and
occupy the leased premises-is involved the condition that such leased property shall be in
existence, and be capable of being used and enjoyed by the lessee. The promise to pay a stateu
sum of money as rent for leased premises for a
certain term is based upon the presumption that
the leased premises shall exist for the terr:t. In
the case at bar if the lessee had been evicted from
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part of the demised premises by the holder of a
title paramount to that of the lessor's, the lessee
would be entitled to an apportionment of the rent.
Tayl. Landi. & rren. 387, and cases there cited.
Under the exception established to the rule,
had the entire leased premises been washed away
by a flood, the relation of landlord and tenant
existing between the parties to this suit would
have from that moment ceased. This relation
would not have been terminated by the act of the
parties, but by operation of law; and the lessee
would have been relieved from the payment of
rent accruing thereafter, upon the principle that
the consideration for his promise to pay such
rent had failed. If we look to the subject-matter
of the lease under consideration, and the language employed by the parties in making the contract, we cannot say that either of these parties,
at the time they made this lease, had in contemplation the fact that the leased premises, or any
part thereof, might be destroyed by a hurricane.
They did not contract with reference to such a
casualty. To use the language of Th1:cKean, C. J .,
in Pollard v. Shaffer, supra, had the lessor been
asked at the time this lease was made," Is it your
intention to hold the lessee liable for the entire
rent reserved in case the leased buildings shall
be destroyed by a cyclone~'' he doubtless would
have answered that he had never considered that
contingency. If the question had been asked the
lessee whether it was his intention to pay the
entire $6,000 rent even if one-half of the leased
property should be destroyed before the expiration of the term, it is very probable that he would
have said that he had no such an intention. Yet,
in construing this contract, we must, if possible,
give effect to the intention of the parties, not\Yithstanding the common-law rule of construction. rro us it seems that the lessor, in effect, said

17
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to the les·see : ''I own this tract of land, and
these ice houses. They are in good repair. T~ey
are fit for the purposes of harvesting and storing
ice. I will hire them to you for five years if you
will pay me twelve hundred dollars per year, and
keep the premises in good repair." To this the
lessee assented. This was an offer and a promise
upon the part of the lessor to furnish for the
entire time the hired property. It was a promise
and a covenant upon the part of the lessee to pay
the monthly installments of rent for the right
to use and occupy the hired property, if it existed.
But it was not a proposition on the part of the
lessor to quit-claim his right to the use and occupancy of the leased premises to the lessee for five
years, in consideration of $6,000 paid or to be
paid by the latter."
The court then continued its discussion of common
law rule and stated:
"This rule of construction of the common la1Y
is a harsh and a technical one. \V e do not certainly know the conditions that existed when it
was formulated, nor do we know in \vhat reasons
it had its origin; but we do know that since the
decision of Paradine v. Jane the conditions of
the race have changed; its conscience and intellect
have been quickened; and this rule, however
meritorious it may have been at the time and
place of its origin, is opposed to the genius and
spirit of the present age, and in conflict with its
judgment and conscience. In one or two instance~,
in states where its effect has not been even
limited by statute, its applicability to real-estate
contracts in this country has been questioned.
Such was the case of Ripley v. \Vightman, 4 McCord, 447, where it was held that the fact that a
house had been rendered untenantable by a hur-
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ricane afforded the lessee a defense to the action
for the rent. In Whitaker v. Hawley, 25 Kan. 674,
the buildings upon the leased premises were
wholly destroyed by fire, without the fault of the
lessee, and the court held that, because of the
accidental destruction by fire of the buildings
upon the leased premises, the lessee was entitled
to an apportionment of the rent. In that case,
Brewer, J., speaking for the court, said: "And
right here it may be remarked that a lease is, in
one sense, a running, rather than a completed,
contract. It is an agreement for a continuous
interchange of values between landlord and tenant, rather than a purchase single and completed
of a term or estate in lands.'' We are aware
that this case stands practically alone, and in a
footnote to :Mc~Iillan v. Solomon, 94 Am. Dec.
654, its isolation is pointed out with a remark by
the editor that it is supported by "much charity
and some logic." We approve of the opinion, because we think it is good law, as well as good
sense. We approve of it also because it is a magnificent protest against slavish devotion to antiquated rules; and we approve of it because it
breathes the spirit of humanity and equity, and
is based on a thought of the nineteenth century.''
Three judges desented from the opinion of the
majority, but it is to be noted that the desenting
judges only desented upon the ground that the tenant
had not surrendered the premises, but had remained
therein.
The court, in Coogan v. Parker, 2 S.C. 255, 16 Arn.
Rep. 659, also held that the common law rule was not
applicable and stated the rule to be followed thusly:

19
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''Unless something of importance has been
overlooked in the foregoing citations, it cannot
be doubted that, in case of substantial destruction of the subject matter of the lease, the tenant
is entitled to descind."
See also the quotation hereafter from Waite v.
Oneil, 76 Fed. 408.
We submit that the common law rule should not
be followed in this state for the reasons stated by the
foregoing authorities, and upon the grounds that it is
not that type of common law rule which has been adopted
in the jurisprudence of this state. But even though
the court should not feel at liberty to repudiate this
common law rule, there is an exception which has become well established in the Untied States, and under
which the case at bar is to be decided.

EXCEPTION TO COMMON LAW RULE
As pointed out above, the lease in the present case
is not a lease of land, it is merely a lease of a portion
of a building. We submit that under the well recognized exception to the common law rule, a substantial
destruction of this building for the purposes for which
it was leased constitutes a defense to an· action for rent
for that period of time after the collapse of the floor.
Two reasons are given for the exception we conten.l
is applicable to this case. The first reason is that where
a portion only of a building is leased by implication,
the parties intend that the subject matter of the lease
shall have continued existence. This reason is exempli20
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fled by the following cases: Da·uis v. Shepperd, 196 Ark.
30~, 117 S.,Y. 2d 337; TVhittaker v. Holmes, 165 Ark. 1,
:263 S."'· 788; Saylor v. Brooks, (l~an.), 220 P. 193;
Greenberg v. Sun Shipbuildiug Company, 277 Pa. 312,
121 ~-\.. 63.

The other reason giYen for this rule is that the
subject matter having been substantially destroyed, the
leased estate is gone and the relation of landlord and
tenant terminated. This basis on the rule is exemplified
by the following cases: TVomach v. McQttarry, 28 Ind.
103, 92 Am. Dec. 306; Ainsworth v. Ritt, 38 Cal. 89;
Graves v. Berdan, 26 N.Y. 493, 29 Barb. 100; Harrington
V~ TVatson, 11 Or. 143, 3 Pacific 173, 50 Am. Rep. 465;
Han v. Baker Lodge, 21 Or. 30, 27 Pacific 166, 13 L.R.A.
158, :28 Am. St. Rep. 723; Shawmut v. Nat'l. Bank v.
City of Boston, 118 :Mass. 125; Waite v. Oneil, 76 Fed.
408.

'Ve

will here discuss briefly some of the foregoing
cases and make quotations therefrom. We will first
consider the group. of cases basing the exception on the
continued existence of the subject matter of the lease.
Davis v. Shepperd, supra, was an action for rent
of a store building which ·was destroyed by fire to such
an extent that it could not be used for business purposes. The lease was for a term of one year, the rent
being payable six months in advance. The fire occurred
two months after the second 6 month rent had become
due. The court stated:

"In 36 Corpus Juris under the title Landlord
and Tenant, it is said that: 'At common law, a
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lessee of premises which are accidently destroyed
subsequent to the making of the lease cannot be
relieved from an express covenant to pay rent
unless he has stipulated in the lease for a cessation of the rent in such case, or the lessor has
covenanted to rebuild.'
''There is a well recognized exception to this
general rule to the effect that where the performance depends on the continued existence of the
building leased and the building is destroyed so
that it cannot be used for the purposes for which
it was leased, the consideration for the contract
fails, and the lessee is no longer obligated to
pay rent on the building. This exception to the
general common law rule is recognized in the
cases of Buerger v. Boyd, 25 Ark. 441 and Whittaker v. Holmes, 165 Ark. 1, 263, S.W. 788.
"It is clear from the evidence in the instant
case that the building was leased for the purpose
of running a store and that purpose only, and
that after the fire it became unfit to use for that
purpose.''

Whitaker v. Holmes, supra, was an action for rent
after the destruction of a building by fire. The court
stated:
"In the case at bar, there is no admission
upori the part of the lessee that he leased anything more than the store building, but, on the
contrary, the testimony of Holmes is direct and
positive to the effect that he did not use any part
of the lot upon which the building stood not
covered by the building. He did not .pay any
rent after the building was destroyed because
he did not feel that he owed it after the building
was destroyed.''
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The court quoted the common la-\v rule contended
for by plaintiffs herein from the ease of B'uerger v. Boyd,
:23 ~-\rk. 4-1J, and then quoh's as follows:
''If one siinply leases the house or room, and
acquires no control over, or interest in, the soil,
and the building be destroyed, we understand the
rule to be other·wise. ''
The court then continued as follows :
"\Ve are convinced that the facts of this
record sho\v that the consideration of the lease
under reYiew was for the store building alone.
\Yhen the building, therefore, was destroyed by
fire, the consideration for the contract failed, and
the appellee Holmes was no longer obligated to
pay rent on the premises."
The court quoted the usual contract rule from 6
A.R.C.L., Page 1005, Section 369, and from 13 O.J. ,
Page 643, Section 718, to the effect that the lease agreement in such case as this is on the basis of the continued
existence of the subject matter of the contract.
In Saylor v. Brooks, supra, the tenant brought an
action for failure by the landlord to rebuild a building.
The lease providing that landlord agreed to keep the
building in good repair. The court discussed the rule
of the liability of a tenant for rent, and the court quotes
from TVhitaker v. IlauJ·ley as follows:
''The fact is, the parties negotiate for the
possession of the building during the entire term.
This underlies the whole thought of lease, just
as fully as \vhen they negotiate for the hiring of
a hor~.P. or a steamboat, or any other chattel. If
2d')
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fire is thought of, it will be mentioned, and, if it
is not mentioned, it is because it is not thought
of, and because they are negotiating for a mutually understood coterminous occupation and
rent. Now to ignore these facts, which actually
underlie the contract and are the very basis upon
which it is made, will practically work out inju:-;tice, no matter how beautiful and symmetrical
the legal structure we erect thereon. * * * Again;;
in almost every other contract, these underlying
facts are recognized, and modify the letter to
accomplish the intent. Thus, in the hiring of
chattels, though the terms be as absolute and
positive as those of a real estate lease, their
absolute destruction without the fault of the
hirer terminates the contract. It is assumed that
the contract only lasts and the obligation to pay
for the use continues only while the property
remains in being, and not until the end of' the:
term named in the contract. Anything which involves the substantial destruction of the chattel
·puts an end to the obligations of either party in
reference to it. * * * So if the hiring is of a room
or rooms in a building, destruction of the building by fire puts an end to the lease (citing cases.) ''
We will now consider some of the cases which hold
that where there is a substantial destruction of the
portion of the building leased, the lease hold estate is
gone and the relationship of landlord and tenant terminated.
In Womach v. McQuarry, supra, the plaintiff owned
a saw mill and a woolen factory which were side hy
side. Plaintiff leased to the defendant the entire saw
mill and one room of the factory to the defendant. Both
buildings were destroyed by fire. The court held that
24
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the defendant was liable for rent on the saw mill but
not on the room in the factory. Thus, this case clearly
presents the application of the harsh common law rule
and the exception thereto. The court recognizes the
existence of the common law rule and then further as
follows:
•' There are, hmYeYer, some comparatively recent cases in which an exception to this rule has
been held to exist * * * This exception applies
only to cases where the demise is a part of an
entire building, as a cellar or an upper room, and
it is founded upon the idea that in such cases it
is not the intention of the lease to grant any interest in the land, save for the single purpose of
the enjoy1nent of the apartment demised, and
that zclzen that enjoyment becomes impossible by
reason of the destruction of the building, there
remains nothing upon which the demise can
operate.''
In Harring/on v. Watson, supra, the court, after
recognizing the common la'v rule, stated:
''The authorities, however, indicate that there
is an exception to this rule that the distinction
of a building does not discharge the liability of
the tenant for rent where the lease is of an upper
story or basement or apartment in a building,
because in such cases, they say, it is not the
interest of the lease to grant any interest in the
land further than is necessary for the enjoyment
of the rooms so demised, and when these are destroyed, there is nothing upon which the lease
can operate. The lease terminates with the estate.
"If, 'the room on the corner' etc., was the
thing leased, and when the principal thing leased
was destroyed, the lessee's interest therein neces2;)
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sarily terminated. The fire dissolved the r~la
tion of landlord and tenant, for there was nothing
left to hold in tenancy~ The thing rented was
gone, destroyed by fire, and as a consequence,
the lease terminated.''
In Waite v. Oneil, supra, the plaintiff brought an
action for rent of a "landing" on the Mississippi River.
A current washed away the landing leaving a vertical
bluff of from 60 to 80 feet high. The court refers to
the common law rule contended for by plaintiffs in the
case at bar and then states:
"The reason for this severe rule is that the
land is deemed the subject of the demise, and the
buildings mere incident. If the land remained to
the tenant after the buildings were destroyed, he
had a right to occupy and use it, his liability for
rent, without abatement was held to continue* * *
In view of the fact that rent is a compensation
for the use of the thing demised, it has been regarded as a harsh rule and contrary to natural
justice, that liability for rent should continue
after the possibility of beneficial use had been
destroyed by accident, and at an early day some
of the judges struggled over its severity * * *
These early efforts to mitigate it were unavailing~
and the rule was finally settled as stated. * * '"
But the very foundation upon which the old rnlt~
was vested is removed if the subject matter of
the demise is destroyed. This exception is noticed
by Justice May in his statement of the common
law rule in Viterbo v. Freedlander (120 N.S. 707,
7 S. Ct. 962), when he adds, "unless at least the
injury is such a destruction of the land as to
amount to an eviction.'' Where the subject matter
of the lease is a room or an apartment in a building, and the building is destroyed, the lease !s
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terminated, the interest of the tenant is at an end,
and the covenant to pay rent extinguished. This
rule is bottomed upon the fact that under such
leases it is to be presumed that the interest of
the tenant in the subjacent land was to continue
only so long as the subject matter of the lease
existed * * * it has never been repudiated or
questioned in cases where it is applicable, so far
as our researches have extended and has been
applied in Inany well reasoned cases.''
The court applied the exception in favor of the
defendant and denied the plaintiff recovery for rent and
In so doing stated:
"In the case at bar, we have already determined that the subject matter of this lease was.
the landing, as it existed at the date of the lease.
A 'landing' implies a place where vessels can be
moored and loaded or discharged. The landing
was effectually destroyed by the ravages of the
river."
This well established exception to the common law
rule is applicable to the case at bar by the very terms
of the lease, the only thing leased is: ''The West one
hundred forty-five feet (145') of that certain building
known as building number one eighty one (181) located_
at 1710 South Redwood Road." In considering whether
or not there has been a circumstantial destruction of
the building, we must take into consideration the purpose for which the building ·was leased. As indicated
in the statement of the case, all parties concerned kne;.-:a:
of the purpose for \Yhich the portion of the building
was rented. That purpose was for the storage of large
lleayy rolls of newsprint. A sizeable portion of the
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flooring collapsed. Upon the happening of that event,
certainly the defendant could not continue the use of
the building for the storage of these heavy rolls. It
had been indicated by the collapse a reasonable person
would conclude that he should remove the heavy weight
from the flooring. No determination could be safely
made that the rest of the flooring had not been weakened
in some way because of the elements or because of the
weight placed upon the floor. In other words, the building had become valueless for the purpose for which it
had been rented. The use and enpoyment of these
premises by the defendant was at an end. That such is
the rule to be followed is indicated by the case of Coogan
v .. Pa.rker, supra, wherein the court stated at Page 679
of 16 Am. Rep.:

'' * * * the construction of all deeds must be
made with reference to the subject matter."
The court again stated at Page 680 :
"The ground of destruction must be the fact
that the structure bears such relation, in point of
fitness and value for the use contemplated by the
lease, as to give rise to the conclusion that the
buildings were the main element of consideration
on which the agreement to pay rent was based."
This is also indicated by the underlined portion of
the quotation from Waite v. Oneil, supra, as follows:
"Unless at least the injury is such a destruction of the
land as to amount to an eviction." An eviction take8
place when the use and enjoyment of the premises is
materially interfered with. It does not require a total
and complete expulsion. C. Silberstein v. Larbovit2.
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(Tex.). :200 8.\Y. 2d 647; Giraud v. illilovitch, 29 Cal.
..:\pp. 543, 83 P. :2d 18:2.
Destruction does not mean complete annihilation,
destruction is harm that substantially affects the value
of the thing. Following· the rule stated in the restatement of the law of torts, section 221, relating to personal property as follows : This is the holding of
Roberts u.. Commercial Casualty Company, 168 Fed. 2d
:23.
Following the analogy of the contractural rule requiring continued existence of the subject matter of the
contract, the court, in Calechman v. Great Atlantic and
Pacific Tea Company, held that the obligation to pay
rent becomes absolute only by use and enjoyment of the
property and upon deprivation of right by unavoidable
accident or contingency of like nature, the tenant's liability for rent only extends to that time.
The court in Taylor v. Hart, supra, the court stated:
"Rent is compensation for the use and implies
the continued existency of the property to be
used.''
That there was such destruction of the portion of
the building as to relieve defendant from rent is indicated by the case of Leonard v. Armstrong, 73 :Mich. 577,
41 ~.\Y. 695, wherein the defendant rented a house for
dwelling purposes and moved out after he was unable
to heat the house and the plumbing fixtures permitted
sen•rl' gas to permeate the house. The court stated:
29
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"If, as defendant contends, from the defects
in the construction of the house, it became untenantable and unfit for habitation, he was not
compelled to keep it and pay rent; or if, from
defects in plumbing, of which he was not advised
when making the lease, sewer gas escaped, and
his family became sick from such causes, and the
home became untenantable and unfit for habitation from such causes, he was not compelled to
keep the premises and pay rent. He rented the
premises for a dwelling for his family, believing,
as it appears, that the premises were tenantable
and fit for the purposes for which he rented them.
After remaining in them he found them unfit for
the purposes for the causes above-mentioned and
moved out.''
In Hazard Bank and Trust Company v. Hazard
Mercantile Company, 220 Ken. 165, 294 S.W. 1034, the
court stated:
''The uncontradicted evidence shows that only
walls or parts of the walls were left standing.
That this amounted to a ·practical destruction of
the building for storeroom purposes there call
be no doubt, and the court did not err in refusing
to submit the question to the jury."
We submit then, that under the foregoing authorities, the collapse of the floor under the circumstances
existing in this case and in view of the fact that the only
purpose in the leasing of the premises was to store
heavy materials, there was a practical and circumstantial destruction of the subject matter of the lease.
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XO APPLICATION OF PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE
'Ye are not here seeking to enforce any covenant
against the plaintiffs and hence the parole evidence rule
has no application. This is merely an application of
the rules concerning the construction of a contract that
is the lease agreement between the parties to determine
whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to recover. Under
these rules of construction, it clearly appears that
plaintiffs are not entitled to recover any rentals in this
action.
Let us hasten to say that the defendant is not
relying upon any warranties in its defense of- this action, and did not introduce said testimony for the purpose of varying the terms of the written contract.

It is our contention that the testimony was compethe intentions of the parties in relation to covenants
tent and material in assisting the court in ascertaining
and limitations of liability under the exceptions set
forth in the lease. The rule appears to be well settled
that a view of the circumstances connected with the
making of the lease will materially assist the court In
ascertaining the meaning of the contracting parties.
In the case of Machen, et al. v. Hooper, et al., 21
Atlantic Reporter 67, the lessors owned a warehouse
which they desired to rent. The lessees desired for the
prosecution of their business just such a warehouse as
this one was supposed to be. In commenting upon the
circumstances connected with the n1aking of this leasP,
in ascertaining the meaning of the contracting parties
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and the limitation of liability under the exceptions set
forth in said lease, the court said :
"The jury had a right to consider the purpose
for which the warehouse was built, and for which
it had been used, and also its apparent strength
and storage capacity, and the business in which
the defendants were engaged when they rented
it, and to find, whether, as men of ordinary prudence and sagacity, they were justified in believing that it was strong enough to bear the weight
of the goods which they stored in it. It is not in
the ordinary course of business to require tenants
to make the examination mentioned in this prayer.
The defendants rented the warehouse for the
prosecution of their business. They and their
business were known to one of the plaintiffs, and
it must have been known that they intended to
use the warehouse for such proper purposes as
their business required. The ,plaintiffs' seventh
prayer proceeds on the theory that, if the building fell because of the weight of the goods stored
in it, or of the manner in which they were stored,
the defendants were liable. It does not leave to
the jury the inquiry whether the weight of the
goods was unreasonable and excessive, or whether
they were stored in a cautious, prudent, and skillful manner. These inquiries were indispensable,
unless the defendants are to be understood a::;
contracting that they would abstain from a reasonable use of the building for the purposes to
which it was apparently adapted. There must be
some limitation to their liability of injurie~
caused by their own act. If a warehouse, to all
appearance strong and stable, should in reality
be so infirm as to fall down when the most ordinary operations of business are going on with
care and prudence within its walls, it would not
be just to say that the fall was caused by thr
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tenant's conduct. Before we can convict the
tenant of inflicting such an injury, we must find
that he did something which he ought not to have
done; that he subjected the building to an unreasonable strain; or that he was in some other
way negligent, incautious, or regardless of duty.
If a building should fall because it was too weak
to endure legitimate use, it could not with propriety be said that the injury was inflicted by a
tenant who was ·prud~ntly and carefully making
such legitimate use of it.
In this case, the lease provided that at the end of
the term, the defendants would quietly surrender to the
lessors the said demised premises and building in the
same good order and condition they were in at the time
of the lease, ordinary wear and tear, loss by fire, (other
than as hereinbefore especially provided against) act~
of God and damage caused by external accident or act:5
of third parties.
These same exceptions are embraced in the case
at bar. In commenting upon the construction of this
lease, the court said :
''Certainly this rule of construction prevails
in this state to the fullest extent. In very many
cases it has been tacitly applied as a matter of
course, without formal enunciation. Our decisions
have been in full accord with the rule stated by
the supreme court of the United States in Nash
v. Towne, 5 \Yall. 699. It may answer a good
purpose if we quote it: ''Courts, in the construction of contracts, look to the language employed,
the subject-matter, and the surrounding circumstances. They are never shut out from the same
light which the parties enjoyed when the con33
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tract was executed, and, in that view, they are
entitled to place themselves in the same situation
as the parties who made the contract~ so as to
view the circumstances as they viewed them, and
so to judge the meaning of the words, and to the
things described.''
The conversations had between an employee of the
Deseret News, one of the plaintiffs in the action, and
two men who were to handle the storage of newsprint
paper in the premises if they were found suitable. In
these conversations, they discussed the age and character of the building, the use to which the building was
to be put, the building was measured for heighth an!l
the size and weights of the different rolls of paper wert~
divulged. They figured out the weights on a square foot
basis. The ·plaintiffs had Rtored in its portion of the
building brick tiling at an average load of 500 pounds
per square foot, while the weight of the paper averaged
from 320 to 331 pounds per square foot. That the
reasonable use of the building was based upon that information and an inspection of the un ierstructure revealed that the building was constructed on cement
footings with vertical cement piers sustaining the fiool'>
and that the soil was observed to be dry.
In the case of Godman et al. v.- Hygrade Food Products Corporation of New York, 3 N.E. 2d 759, the court
says:
"In the application of phrases of such general significance to a building which is the subject matter of a lease various things are to be
taken into account. Among thes·e are the character of the building and of its original construe34
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tion, Judkins v. Charette, 255 Mass. 76, 82, 151
N.E. 81, 45 A.L.R. 1; the use to which the building is to be put and the character of a business
there to be carried on, Kaplan v. Flynn, 255 Mass.
127, 130, 150 N .E. 872, 45 A.L.R. 6 ; the age of
the building and its general capacity for use at
the time the lease is given, Drouin v. Wilson, 80
Yt. 335, 67 A. 825, 13 Ann. Cas. 93; St. Joseph & .
St. Louis Railroad v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain &
Southern Railway, 135 :Mo. 173, 36 S.W. 602, 33
L.R.A. 607; Lehmaier v. Jones, 100 App. Div.
495, 91 N.Y.S. 687; Lister v. Lane & Nesham,
(1893) 2 Q.B. 212; Lurcott v. Wakly & Wheeler,
(1911) K.B. 905, 916; and the class of tenant and
the kind of business of a tenant who would be
likely to lease the building, Miller v. McCardell,
19 R.I. 304, 33 A. 445, 30 L.R.A. 682; Proudfoot
v. Hart, 25 Q.E.D. 42."
In the case of Harris v. Corliss Chapman and Drake,
the defendants lease from plaintiffs for a term of years
the first story and basement of a brick building in the
City of St. Paul. Among other things, the lease provideJ
that the tenant would not be liable for damage by the
elements.
''The court below found that during the term
'the said basement became so damp and wet and
unhealthy as to be untenantable, and unfit for
use by the defendant in its business; that said
premises were so rendered untenantable by
springs of water percolating and oozing through
and under the walls of said basement from the
exterior of said building.'
"The sole question is whether, upon these
facts, the basement was rendered untenantable
'by the elements,' within the meaning of the
lease. The terms 'the elements,' and 'damages
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by the elements,' are somewhat uncert~in a~d indefinite expressions, and very little a1d· w1ll be
derived from resorting to any technical or scientific ·discussion of the meaning of the word 'elements.' We should rather look to see whether
the word has received any fixed and accepted
meaning in the language of leases, and take the
contract by its four corners, and try to ascertain
how such an expression would be ordinarily understood by conveyancers and business men. The
expression 'by fire or the elements' occurs twice
elsewhere in this lease. Immediately preceding
the provision quoted is one to the effect that if
the ·premises shall at any time during the term
be rendered wholly untenantable 'by fire or the
elements,' and the injured premises can be rebuilt
or repaired within three months, then the lessor is
to rebuild or repair, if the lessee shall so request,
'within ten days after such occurrence;' otherwise
such occurrence shall operate to terminate the
lease. It is apparent that the expression, ''by fire
or the elements,' is used in the same sense in
both instances. The lease also contains a covenant
on part of the lessee to surrender the premises
at the expiration of the term in as good condition
as the same were in when occupation under the
lease began, usual wear and tear of reasonable
and careful use thereof, 'and destruction thereof
or injury thereto by fire or the elements, excepted.' We think, with the defendant, that the
expression is here used also in the same sense.
"The lease contains no covenant on part of
the lessor to make repairs, exce-pt those above
quoted, and hence he was not bound to do so,
much less to make improvements or betterments;
the policy of the law being to require the tenant,
before he takes a lease, to examine the premises,
and elect, once for all, whether they will suit his
purposes. While the finding is silent upon the
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subjt>et. it is fair to assume that the percolation
of water into the basement was not the result
of any extraordinary or unusual occurrence,
such as a flood or freshet, or of any cause originating subsequent to the demise, but was the
natural result of a cause fully existing at and
prior to the date of the lease, such as the wet
or springy character of the soil on which the
building was erected or that adjacent, or some
inherent defect in the plan of its structure, as
the lack of proper drains to carry off the water
of the oozing springs. In such a case, although
the existence of a wetter season of the year, yet
the efficient cause existed at the date of the
demise, and the results were but the natural and
ordinary operations of the laws of nature."
Of course, this case is easily distinguishable from
the situation of that in the case at bar. In the present
case, the records of the weather bureau show that on
Saturday and Sunday, 42j100's of an inch of rain fell
in that area accompanied by sudden thunder shower8
and heavy down pour. This storm was a sudden, unusual and unexpected action of the elements in that it
was figured out that thousands of gallons of water fell
upon the roof and the platforms of the building, and a
survey of the premises disclosed that the southwest
corner was the lowest point underneath the building,
and the testimony from expert witnesses who made surveys of the premises was that it did drain from both
an east and west direction into that low area. The
court will undoubtedly take judicial notice of the fact
that the annual precipitation in the State of Utah is
only 13 7:2j100's inches per annum, and that this stornl
37
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deposited over a period of 48 hours lj26th of the annual
rainfall.
The testimony of Mr. Wycoff, who went inside the
building on Monday, September 20, the day after the
floor collapsed, was that there was about 6 inches of
water in the collapsed area, and that on account of
the large amount of water, the ground had become so
soft that he could and did ·push a broom handle without
much exertion to a depth of 2 feet, far below the
cement footings on which the structure rested. Naturally, this sudden action of the elements, and the collectin~.
of water, and the softening of the ground to an extent
of 2 feet did weaken the cement understructure and
permit the sinking of the footings as shown by the expert testimony of Mr. Ulrich to the extent that the
floor was subject to a span of 20 feet instead of a 10
foot span under which the building had been constructed.
Mr. Ulrich figured out from scientific formulas that
this additional strain on the timbers greatly increaset1
the fiber stress far beyond the fracture stress and that
consequently the floor collapsed.
In the case of the Oakland Motor Car Company r.
Rippey Motor Company, 154 S.E. 823, the court commented on what constituted damage by the elements. In
that case, plaintiff brought suit against defendant for
rent of a certain building. There was no dispute made
by the record as to the amount due for rent, but defendant set up that during the period of the lease, a
heavy wind storm prevailed in which the rented ·premise8
were located; that the wind reached an ''unusual, 8l'Yrn·
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:

and dangerous Yelocity" on account of which, all or
nearly all the plate-glass windows in the leased premises
were blown out. The "·indows were repaired by the
defendant at a stated cost and he made demand upon
the plaintiff for reimbursement but had been refused.
The court directed a. verdict for the plaintiff in the
amount represented by the difference between the
amount due for rent and the amount expended by the
defendant in repairing the broken glass.
"None of the cases cited by counsel, or which have
been examined, indicate that a violent windstorm of unusual nature which could not be reasonably forseen or
guarded against, resulted in damages, should not be
deemed a casualty and it seems clear that the damages
to the pia te-glass windows of the building leased in the
instant case resulted in a casualty within the meaning of
the contract", the court concluded.
In conclusion, we contend that the defendant did
not breach its coYenant under the lease; that the damage
to the building was a result of sudden, unusual and unexpected action of the elements; that the building was
rendered untentable by reason of the damage thereto,
and that defendant should be relived of any liability in
this cause of action.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERTS & ROBERTS
Attorneys for Defendant
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